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oren harman & michael r. dietrich

introduction
outsiders as innovators
in the life sciences
introduction
Both intellectually and institutionally, the life sciences occupy a fascinating middle ground between the physical and exact sciences,
on the one hand, and the social sciences and humanities on the other. If
biology were an animal, it would be a duck-billed platypus—something that
appears chimeric, yet is fully rooted in its own historical lineage of accumulating adaptations, tinkering, and change.
Like that strange aquatic mammal, “half bird, half beast,”1 its features
point to its origins and ecology. Biology as a science has come into being
as a patchwork, assuming its present visage as a consequence of myriad
interactions between diﬀerent traditions of knowledge, method, and philosophy while maintaining an overarching quest for understanding of the
natural world. Indeed, historically, many researchers have come from outside biology to ask fundamentally biological questions. These outsiders have
played a crucial and deﬁning role in the growth of modern biology; they
have brought new skills and ideas to the “inside” and have thus added
something new to biology. As a consequence, biology can feel sometimes as
if it is a strange hybrid—with a bill, a ﬂat tail, fur, and webbed feet. After all,
biologists include among their number men and women who sit before computers crunching numbers, as well as cavers who crawl through subterranean spaces in search of lizards; and biology counts among its tools patchclamps and test tubes and microchip arrays and bird-snares. Its worldviews
range from reductionism to dualism, idealism to emergence. It can often
seem confusing: is biology really just one thing? Like that “highly interesting novelty,” as the beguiling Australian bird-and-reptile-like mammal was
once called, it is indeed one thing. And like the platypus, biology has been
formed by adapting forces coming from outside, from the environment of
other disciplines and practices. The platypus may seem like a paradox, because it appears to be chimeric. Biology likewise appears chimeric, but has
attained an internal integrity and innovative potential from those external
forces.
The molecular revolution of the late twentieth century, for example, was
to a large degree stimulated by the inﬂux of physicists into biology, applying
1
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as they did both a diﬀerent style and approach to the problem of heredity.
Ecology and population biology, too, have been determinatively shaped by
the arrival of mathematicians to these ﬁelds, using tools from their own
discipline to resolve biological problems with unfamiliar instruments. Linguists have applied their training and tools to investigate problems in cognition, social scientists to attack the puzzles of animal behavior, philosophers
to probe conceptual foundations, writers to sharpen their pens on evolution,
computer scientists and engineers to try to crack the mystery of life. As such,
these “outsiders” have supplied important sources of innovation in biology
and, each in his or her way, contributed to its patchwork design. What is of
interest to us here is the manner in which scientists recruited from diﬀerent disciplines have helped, and continue to help, produce novel approaches,
concepts, theories, experiments, practices, insights, and—ultimately—novel
scientiﬁc understanding.
This book seeks to provide historical descriptions and analyses for the
ways in which researchers from the “outside” have been sources of signiﬁcant innovation. The collection of cases assembled here critically examines
these sources of innovation by considering how diﬀerent researchers were
able to integrate ideas, techniques, and methods across divergent scientiﬁc
communities. As will become apparent, these innovations were NOT idiosyncratic accidents, but the result of the careful work of making intellectual connections, translating idioms, creating languages, and fostering new
forms of collaboration that bridged training and experience in the biological sciences with a rich array of ﬁelds, disciplines, and perspectives. In the
end, outsider interventions have given biology its peculiar form.

the problem of innovation
As early as 1667, Thomas Sprat, historian of the Royal Society of London,
noted a connection between being an outsider to a trade and inventiveness.
A glance from an angle, Sprat argued, might well reveal a new aspect of nature. More recently, sociologists Joseph Ben-David and Robert Merton have
shown the importance of disciplinary immigrants for the development of
a par ticular science.2 Merton, though, problematized a strict dichotomy or
divide between those considered insiders and outsiders. As a result, later
thinking about disciplinary boundaries reﬂected a more dynamic perspective regarding disciplinary identity. Lynn Nyhart’s discussion of the birth of
the discipline of physiology from the older anatomy in nineteenth-century
German universities, on the other hand, considered the role played by different institutions in erecting boundaries between old and incipient ﬁelds.3
2 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
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In a broader, more theoretical manner, Peter Galison has applied the anthropological notion of the “trading zone” to scientiﬁc practice, analyzing a
number of examples from physics in which scientists of diﬀerent subﬁelds
have met—creating common pidgin idioms, and then creoles—in order to
jointly attack conundrums.4
But if the “outsider” and the “outsider as innovator” have been recognized as important categories in the history of science more generally, the
treatment of the “outsider” in the history of biology has been focused more
narrowly on speciﬁc instances. A number of histories of the molecular revolution, for example, highlight the role of physicists, such as Max Delbrück
and Francis Crick, who became biologists and played a foundational role
in the creation of molecular biology.5 Evelyn Fox Keller, in her book Making
Sense of Life, features some of the cyberneticists and artiﬁcial lifers who used
metaphors from the world of computing to help probe deep problems
in development and embryology.6 A comparative treatment of the range of
“outsiders” that have shaped the course of biology more broadly is sorely
missing. Bringing together a diverse set of examples allows us to explore the
various conditions that fostered both their movement into biology and their
innovative contributions to biological understanding.

what makes an “outsider”?
In Outsider Scientists we conceive of outsiders in terms of academic disciplines. We are interested in scholars trained or practicing in a nonbiological discipline who moved into some branch of biology. These disciplinary
newcomers or outsiders bring with them perspectives, skill, and training
that are often not shared by insiders—those trained within biology. The fundamental question we are considering asks how moving from a ﬁeld outside of biology to a ﬁeld within biology has served as a signiﬁcant source
of scientiﬁc innovation.7 We have asked our authors to consider what features of their subjects’ original scientiﬁc training and research experience
in a nonbiological context allowed them to make innovative contributions
to the ﬁeld of biology that they eventually joined. But a word of caution: we
do not wish to hang too much on the category of discipline, because we do
not think that the question of training and innovation depends strictly on
moving from one discipline to another, nor do we believe that disciplines,
as such, are hard and ﬁ xed categories. Rather we are interested in considering movement between communities of scientists with divergent practices,
paradigms, or habitus and the role that this intellectual movement plays in
innovation within biology.
introduction | 3
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Movement between communities occurs not just between disciplines
but also within them. Increasingly, recognized subdisciplines have developed almost insurmountable barriers, as specializations divide the landscape and render movement more diﬃcult within. This is true for biology as
much if not more than for physics, chemistry, and computing. For that reason, we also consider a number of examples in which researchers from one
subdiscipline within biology crossed into a second subdiscipline to make
contributions there. An exemplary case would be Ilya Metchnikoﬀ moving
from developmental biology to immunology, or Francois Jacob, moving from
work on bacteria to mice. Such cases are similar to those of nonbiologists
crossing into biology because here too, researchers bring with them completely new skills, perspectives and training. These par ticular outsiders we
term “insider-outsiders.”
Our deﬁnition of the outsider, then, is restricted. Excluded from it are
outsiders on account of religion, ethnicity, gender, and character—though
for all of these, to be sure, fascinating examples abound. The sole and guiding principle for Outsider Scientists is that the individual in question should
have moved from one intellectual community, with its distinctive practices
and established conceptions, into an area of biology new to that individual.
Because these migrating scholars often bring with them tools, techniques,
theories, and practices, we could have chosen to follow these instrumentalities into new areas, but we chose instead to follow individuals into new communities and institutions. The biographical focus of each of the following
chapters is not intended to portray scientists as lone knowers, but as members of new disciplinary communities—members who signiﬁcantly alter the
practices of those communities.
Making judgments as to who is an outsider and who isn’t, however,
necessarily remains a complicated aﬀair. To begin with, one needs to assume that there is an “inside” outsiders must enter, and this was not always
true in biology. Lamarck may have coined the term in 1802, but biology as a
coherent ﬁeld and well-deﬁned community, with institutions and academic
programs, par ticular subdisciplines, research agenda, and journals, took
time to establish, and of course remains in ﬂux. When does one mark the
inception of a ﬁeld: When its name is coined? When the ﬁrst society of
practitioners is founded? When the subject is included as a ﬁeld of study in
the universities? However one approaches this problem, it is clear that the
trajectory and growth of biology was unique in diﬀerent historical contexts,
such as in the German-, French-, and English-speaking worlds.8
Wary of the slipperiness—and to a degree the arbitrariness—of deﬁning
a hard and fast historical date for the birth of biology as a discipline, we
4 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
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have chosen to include in this volume a ﬁrst section that will treat a number of early examples of interesting nineteenth-century practitioners whose
engagement with problems of a living nature illustrates the very diﬃculty
involved in speaking about “outsiders” with any conﬁdence before the late
nineteenth century. Gregor Mendel was a clergyman who had little or no
formal training in anything called “biology.” The worlds that he uniquely
united—experimental physics gleaned at the University of Vienna, the
middle-European business of practical plant and animal breeding, and
the local scientiﬁc society at Brünn—gave birth to a research program that
would play a crucial role in the establishment of genetics and the establishment of biology as an identiﬁable ﬁeld years later. Mendel helps us understand, both intellectually and in terms of earlier local traditions, what the
creation of an “inside” for modern biology entails. Similarly, the role of Pasteur the businessman and chemist, moving into what was rapidly becoming
an institutional biologie in France, helps put a ﬁnger on the process of the
birth of the disciplinary divides that deﬁned a distinct biology, as does Felix
d’Herelle’s uniquely self-taught (and fascinatingly international) trajectory
in microbiology. Finally, to round oﬀ the early examples, the contributions
of Samuel Butler, the Victorian novelist, serve to trigger a discussion of the
ways in which literary engagement with the idea of evolution challenged a
number of crucial divides: the science-philosophy divide via the teleology
and causality debate, and the public-private divide via the debate concerning
the proper forum for negotiating scientiﬁc disputes. These four individuals
play an important role in allowing us more carefully to consider the criteria
for “inside” and “outside” in biology as they developed historically.
Thus, the ﬁrst part of the book, “Outsiders before the Inside,” treats
the dichotomies of teleology–eﬃcient causality, amateur-professional, localinternational, industry-academia, and public-private, each of which played
a role in the birth of modern biology. Other examples could have served us
here, but we have chosen these early individuals in order to create a meaningful set of contrasting cases to later ﬁgures who were involved in the
creation of innovations following explicit acts of boundary crossing into
areas of modern biology.
Recognizing “outsiders” in biology becomes more straightforward as we
consider the development of the biological sciences in the twentieth century, and it is this century that is the main focus of Outsider Scientists.
Here the challenge of understanding outsiders and their innovations in
biology pertains less to the ambiguity of describing an “inside” or an “outside,” and more to a problem of selecting a range of both diverse and representative outsiders. There have been many practitioners in biology who
introduction | 5
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can be thought of as “outsiders,” and we have had to think long and hard
about whom to include. We would have liked to include more than eventually made it in—there are, in other words, outsiders who “got away.” One
thinks in par ticular of Max Delbrück, Herbert Simon, Isaac Asimov, Gerald
Edelman, Seymour Benzer and, reaching further back, Goethe as an early
“outsider before the inside,” who as an artist and morphologist attempted
to reconcile his divergent pursuits. It is our hope that this par ticular collection will spur others to examine such ﬁgures in the mode we suggest. The
ﬁgures that have made it into our book have been chosen to illustrate the
myriad ways in which “outsider science” comes about and functions. For
each case we have chosen expert contributors, each with a broad and deep
knowledge of the relevant history and context.
Before we continue any further, we’d like to address a quick word to
the skeptic. The category of the “outsider” in science, the objection might
run, is too diﬀuse to be of any value. After all, there are many ways to be an
“outsider,” and the dynamic of insider-outsider interactions will necessarily
take many forms. Our reply to the skeptic is meant to disarm: we agree. Our
goal is not to deﬁne exhaustively what it has meant to be an “outsider” to
biology. Given the shifting nature of biology as a discipline, that would be
a Herculean task. But we do not shy away from this diversity. Very much to
the contrary, we are consciously setting out to present it in as full a fashion
as possible rather than unthinkingly “lumping” all the disparate histories
into a conceptual straitjacket. Clearly, the contingencies matter, as do the
myriad facets of the outsider incursions—that is the point of the historical
narratives that follow. Our goal is to oﬀer a range of historical cases that
allow us to comparatively understand the elements of discipline crossing
that contribute to processes of scientiﬁc innovation.
Our analysis does assume that “discipline” is a legitimate historical category. While most scholars would agree that biology is and has been a
discipline, they can diﬀer on what exactly constitutes a discipline.9 Specialization and institutionalization through markers such as professional societies, journals, and designated funding streams have typically been recognized as elements of discipline formation. More recently, epistemic criteria of
problem deﬁnition and practice have been added. Minding and maintaining
the boundaries of scientiﬁc disciplines has also been the object of scholarly research, especially as biology itself has emerged as a dynamic enterprise. While
contemporary biology, especially since the rise of the molecular revolution, is
widely recognized as a mosaic or hybrid of many diverse subﬁelds, in the early
twentieth century there was a distinct movement to seek a uniﬁed biology.
Historians, such as Betty Smocovitis, have written eloquently about the de6 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
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sire to articulate a common core to the discipline of biology and about the
challenges to this uniﬁcation. While consensus on a unifying theory, even
within the so-called evolutionary synthesis, proved elusive, scientiﬁc societies were formed, journals established, and the social and cultural deﬁnition
of biology was perpetuated, even if it was always in motion. The ﬂuidity
of the disciplining of biology does make it a moving target for historians.
However, we do not need an entity etched in stone. We need an entity that is
suﬃciently diﬀerent from neighboring areas of inquiry that we can say that
chemistry as a discipline, for instance, diﬀers from biology as a discipline in
terms of imparting to its members distinctive concepts, theories, methods,
practices, and approaches. The various sub-branches of biology will diﬀer
among themselves, but the general pattern of the whole will yet distinguish
it from other major areas of inquiry, such as chemistry.
Discipline crossing draws our critical attention to forms of epistemic
diﬀerence that may be rooted in the style of thought an outsider brings with
her, a par ticular set of intellectual tools, an experimental apparatus or design, or that may involve more broadly (and deeply) a general vision or speciﬁc
motivation.10 Discipline crossing may relate to the way that the reception of
outsiders is determined by sociological as opposed to intellectual reasons,
and how this varies depending on the particular “outside” one is coming
from. The salient objective is that the cast of “outsiders” illustrate, as a group,
a wide spectrum of the diﬀerent facets of the phenomena.

the outsiders who made it in
To help the reader, and in order to provide an organizing framework, we
have divided the book into six parts. They are 1) Outsiders before the Inside,
2) Outsiders from the Physical Sciences, 3) Outsiders from Mathematics,
4) Outsiders from the Human Sciences, 5) Insider-Outsiders, and 6) Outsiders from Informatics.
As we have mentioned, the category “Outsiders before the Inside” includes accounts of Mendel, Pasteur, d’Herelle, and Butler. The histories of
these ﬁgures will introduce a perspective on innovation through the integration of diverse interests, approaches, and practices before there was a clearly
demarcated discipline identiﬁed as biology. Importantly, they provide a
contrast to the stories of the later periods in which disciplinary markers are
more easily discerned, since those markers were more actively enforced after the turn of the twentieth century. Indeed, many of the dichotomies these
early examples highlight—such as teleology vs. eﬃcient causality, amateur vs.
professional, industry vs. academia—provided the deﬁnitional distinctions
that later biologists used to create and enforce disciplinary boundaries. All
introduction | 7
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four cases, authored by Sander Gliboﬀ, Jonathan Simon, William Summers,
and Michael Ruse, respectively, speak to the power of movement across the
intellectual terrain as a means to foster new insights.
In part 2, essays by Sahotra Sarkar, Gregory Morgan, and Hallam Stevens
introduce us to a sample of the many physicists who crossed into biology in
the twentieth century. Erwin Schrödinger and Linus Pauling may be familiar subjects, but Sarkar and Morgan provide careful new consideration of
how these two Nobel laureates translated their knowledge of physics into
biological idiom, and in so doing helped create the foundations of molecular biology. Stevens describes the work of Walter Goad, a less well-known
ﬁgure, who used his understanding of computational physics acquired in
atomic bomb work to reshape the genetic databases and algorithms that
now form the basis of bioinformatics.
In our third part, Michael Dietrich and Robert Skipper Jr., Maya Shmailov,
and Jay Odenbough each consider scientists at the interface of mathematics and biology. R. A. Fisher, Nicolas Rashevsky, and Robert MacArthur all
brought mathematical and statistical insights to bear on biological phenomena in ways that transformed biological practice from its earlier naturalist
tradition. The statistical tools developed by Fisher alone have become completely commonplace in all branches of biology as a result.
Part 4 considers outsiders from the human sciences, with essays by
W. Tecumseh Fitch on the linguist Noam Chomsky, T. J. Horder on the philosopher David Hull, and Erika Lorraine Milam on the writer Elaine Morgan.
These cases do not represent equally inﬂuential incursions into biology:
Chomsky’s attempt to pry open the brain by exploring the rules of grammar
helped bring about a revolution in the cognitive sciences, while Hull’s and
Morgan’s grappling with par ticular theories of systematics and evolution,
respectively, produced more of a glancing blow toward their discipline of
evolutionary biology. Still, taken together, the three examples illustrate
salient features of biology’s intersection with the humanities.
In part 5 we meet two “insider-outsiders”: Ilya Metchnikoﬀ and François
Jacob. In their essays on these internal migrants, Fred Tauber and Michel
Morange show how movement across subﬁeld boundaries can be both difﬁcult and transformative. Drawing from his background in embryology and
development, Metchnikoﬀ challenged the prevailing theories of immunity
of his day, while Jacob took principles he had learned working on bacteria
and phage in molecular biology and applied them to the mouse in the study
of disease.
The ﬁnal section of the book deals with the inﬂuence of informaticians on the life sciences. Chapters by Ehud Lamm on John von Neumann
8 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
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and Norbert Weiner, Oren Harman on George Price, and Luis Campos on
Drew Endy reveal how biological systems have been reimagined in sometimes radical ways by outsiders redesigning their new disciplinary homes
using the theoretical frameworks and idioms of computer science and
informatics.

what have we learned from our outsiders?
The essays that follow shed light on three elements of the relationship that is
our focus: the outsider, the process of coming in to biology, and the process
of innovation. Concentrating on these three elements allows us to explore
the roles of features of personalities, institutions, and prior training that
have shaped the wide range of scientiﬁc novelties described in the chapters.
We start with the outsider.
On the Outsider
The outsiders described here are not your typical scientists. When it comes
to “outsiderness” as an aspect of character, many of these individuals reveal
traits that rendered their crossing of boundaries almost natural. They are
bona ﬁde transgressors. They see little point in respecting conventional
boundaries, either because they view them as inherently ridiculous or because they don’t see them at all. A quintessential example is George Price.
He was nothing if not an intellectual scavenger. Trained in nuclear chemistry,
he switched from the Manhattan Project to work at Bell Labs on transistors
and informatics, then to cancer research at a Minnesota hospital, then to
magazine writing on current aﬀairs, then to computer problems at IBM,
then ﬁnally to mathematical evolution, all the while sending unsolicited letters to Nobel laureates that claimed breakthroughs in ﬁelds as disparate as
neurophysiology and economics. Price saw problems, not disciplines, and,
fueled by a cocksure attitude and dismissiveness toward convention—for
better and for worse—acted accordingly. Linus Pauling shared with Price a
similar disposition. Fiercely independent of mind, Pauling used the occasion of his 1954 chemistry Nobel lecture to admonish young scientists never
to take anything on authority and always to think for themselves, respecting no boundaries; eight years later, he was in Stockholm again receiving a
second Nobel Prize, this time for Peace. Erwin Schrödinger, too, possessed
an aspect of character that made him a natural outsider: the conﬁdence of a
man who thought—together with Einstein, it must be admitted, but against
the better judgment of the rest of the physics community—that the apparent
paradoxes of quantum mechanics would eventually disappear. It was this
conﬁdence, no doubt, that helped to stoke his pretension to explain heredity
introduction | 9
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by means of quantum mechanics when he attempted an answer to the question “What is life?” in a series of lectures delivered in 1943.
“Cocksure,” “arrogant,” “conﬁdent”—these are appellations we ﬁnd applied again and again to our outsiders, and not by insiders alone. Nicolas
Rashevky stormed into the life sciences from mathematics seeking to shake
its very core (“You name it, he had a theory on it,” one commentator quipped);
“hot-tempered” Ilya Metchnikoﬀ humiliated Nobel laureates in a ﬁeld he had
never studied but wished to transform; Drew Endy, hyperconﬁdent and extolling a culture of “cool,” sought to revolutionize biology by using engineering principles to synthesize life itself. The diminutive Elaine Morgan, Erika
Milam tells us, “had sass,” marshaling wit and humor to take her malechauvinist targets to task. Earlier in the century, Felix d’Herelle, marshaled
the autodidact’s bold self-possession to revolutionize microbiology, and R. A.
Fisher, like a terrier hound (which he incidentally resembled), showed incorrigible persistence against opponents in applying statistics to evolution and
heredity. Of course, outsiders’ personalities were nevertheless by no means
static.
Often outsiders possessed a broad “vision” which they actively pursued:
Rashevsky and Fisher and MacArthur sought to mathematize biology and
Pauling sought to bring physical chemistry to biology, for example. Fisher
believed that this kind of intervention from the outside was most diﬃcult
for insiders to accept: “A new subject for investigation,” Dietrich and Skipper quote him as saying, “will ﬁnd itself opposed by indiﬀerence, by inertia,
and usually by ridicule. A new point of view, however, aﬀecting thought on
a wide range of topics may expect a much ﬁercer antagonism.” Sometimes,
as with Price, there is no more than a kind of problem-speciﬁc intellectual
opportunism. Sometimes, as with Endy, perhaps both are present.
But incursions from the outside are not always the result of a particular
aspect of personality; sometimes they simply describe the act of crossing an
unseen, or alternatively a closely patrolled, divide to solve a particular problem. Our “Outsiders before the Inside” are examples of the former. Each, in his
own way, moved from one métier to another without necessarily exercising
the muscles of overbearing conﬁdence, or expressing hatred of authority, or
indulging in contempt for convention (think of the gentle curate, Mendel)—
though Butler probably imagined himself a Renaissance man. Louis Pasteur,
to the medical establishment, might have been insuﬀerable, but microbiology, at any rate, had yet to deﬁne its boundaries. Walter Goad, by contrast, is
a modern example of a man who didn’t possess the ﬁery “outsider” character, but nevertheless recognized a void, entering the ﬁeld, with the help of a
long-standing institutional interest at Los Alamos in biology and medicine,
10 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
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to apply numerical data management tools to genetic databasing. It was his
tool—the computer—rather than his temperament that led Goad into biology, allowing him to import ready-made ways of thinking, doing, and organizing with little resistance.
Regardless of personality, the outsider’s training was always of the utmost importance. Perhaps we should not be surprised to ﬁnd that no small
fraction of our outsiders actually had a prior connection to biology before
trying to enter the ﬁeld. Drew Endy may have received a D in high school
biology for failing to recite the Latin names of 200 insects, but Robert
MacArthur, whose dad was a geneticist, actually got his PhD in ecology.
Norbert Weiner, too, studied biology before becoming a mathematician,
showing par ticular interest in physiology and teleology. Fisher, from the
outset, had been hooked by eugenics and biometry, alongside mathematics,
and Schrödinger, though most people don’t know this, was an international
authority on the physiology and biophysics of color vision. Still, it is the
prior training in the nonbiological discipline that we are most interested
in, since the training usually lays the foundation for the incursion to begin
with. We’ll address this par ticular issue when we turn to innovation, but
ﬁrst let’s take a look at the process of the outsider moving in.
On Moving In
The process of crossing a divide entails a number of elements that we ﬁnd
recurring in one form or another in many of the outsiders considered here.
These are the role of patrons and forward-looking funding bodies; the role
of institutions; collaboration both with insiders and fellow outsiders; courting; and—closer to the content of innovation itself—processes of translation,
simpliﬁcation (especially with theoreticians), and sometimes popularization
(especially with outsiders from the humanities). Each of these features represents an aspect of institutions and the social context that supported the
outsider seeking to bring an original result, method, or perspective to the
life sciences.
To begin with, a patron, it would seem, is a wonderful thing to have for
an outsider. A number of our outsiders manifestly beneﬁted from having
enthusiastic supporters, though others neither sought nor were oﬀered
assistance. Perhaps the starkest example of patronage here is that of Major
Leonard Darwin, Charles Darwin’s fourth son and an avid eugenicist, who,
from quite early on, decided that he was going to do everything he could
to help advance R. A. Fisher’s career. This meant helping him publish his
famous 1918 paper on the correlation of relatives on the supposition of Mendelian inheritance. The paper played a historical role in wedding Mendelian
introduction | 11
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genetics to Darwinian selection. It was, however, initially rejected by Fisher’s great nemesis, Karl Pearson, for publication in his journal Biometrika.
Thanks to Leonard Darwin’s intervention, the paper was published in the
Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Moreover, Darwin arranged to
have Fisher supported by monthly stipends, enabling him to develop his synthesizing insights, which culminated in what became his magnum opus,
The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, in 1930. George Price, too, enjoyed
patronage from John Maynard Smith and Bill Hamilton, collaborators both;
but their aid went beyond the usual bounds. It was Hamilton, after all, who
by way of a ruse cajoled the editor of Nature into publishing Price’s pathbreaking covariance paper, which no doubt otherwise would not have seen
the light of day. Similarly, without the generosity and encouragement of John
Maynard Smith, their historic joint paper, which applied game theory to
animal conﬂict, would most probably have never been written.
Felix d’Herelle provides perhaps the starkest counterexample, a man
who made it decidedly on his own. Having left school at seventeen, and working from the periphery, d’Herelle was neither a member nor even known to
either the Koch or Pasteur school of microbiology, at least for quite some
time. Relying on his own reason and conﬁdence, and all the while moving
from place to place (Canada to Guatemala to Mexico to Argentina to Columbia to Algeria to Tunisia to Cyprus to France, and more), he never enjoyed
any form of patronage, except for a short-term commission tendered by the
Argentine Minister of Agriculture to exterminate locusts in his country.
D’Herelle was a lone maverick.
Individual patrons may not be necessary, but some form of support or
acceptance is often crucial, such as forward-looking funding bodies. Warren
Weaver of the Rockefeller Foundation is a celebrated example of a supportive
administrator, one who had the foresight to oﬀer critical aid to both Pauling
and Rashevsky at Cal Tech and at the University of Chicago, respectively.11 In
both cases, Weaver saw what many who were unequivocally insiders didn’t
notice, that outside tools—structural chemistry and mathematics, in these
cases—could go a long way to help solve important “insider” problems.
Drew Endy, on the other hand, at least when he began, was rather impeded
by the main funding taps: one agency threw his grant request out the window citing irrelevance, and worse, complete lack of believability.
Indeed, outsiders don’t always ﬁnd institutional homes that are willing to
take a chance on projects that seem to many unimportant or even sinister.
Pauling, however good a chemist he was known to be, ended up creating
his own institute, the Institute of Orthomolecular Medicine, later renamed
the Linus Pauling Institute of Science and Medicine. He used the institute
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to pursue his vitamin C research, which does indicate that buying a home
for “free thinking” doesn’t always lead to the best results. Rashevsky, too,
found the going rather rough at the University of Chicago, Weaver’s support
notwithstanding. Moving (or rather being moved) from the Department of
Psychology to the Department of Physiology and back again, he found his
work continually falling between the cracks. He was too mathematical for the
biologists and too biological for the physicists and mathematicians. Finally,
he solved the problem by creating his own Journal of Mathematical Biophysics, which had more success than the Institute of Orthomolecular Medicine.
Outsider incursions always occur within some institutional context. Some
outsiders were fortunate to ﬁnd the “right” institution, one that provided
support for newcomers, encouraged collaboration, and sought interdisciplinary connections to address biological problems. Fisher, for example, was
free at the Rothamsted Experimental Station to pursue both practical and
theoretical work integrating statistics, biology, and eugenics that might
very well have been impossible elsewhere (including Cambridge). Price, too,
years later, enjoyed the backing of a kind institution: when he walked oﬀ the
street into the University College London biostatistics department with his
covariance equation written on a piece of paper—the ultimate outsider act if
ever there was one—he was aﬀorded an honorary research position within
the hour and summarily helped to secure a grant for further research; University College London, mind you, was a world-leading center of genetics at
the time. Goad’s career, too, makes the point of institutional importance.
Indeed, Los Alamos’s war time successes rendered it continually crucial to
national security, which meant greater latitude for senior scientists in following curiosity-driven research. As Hallam Stevens shows, the “exigencies of
war time work” also promoted interdisciplinary collaboration. This meant
for Goad that he could play a leading role in convincing the National Institutes of Health to fund the GenBank project. Institutional backing, then,
seems to be a relative quantity when it comes to outsiders. Some, like Fisher,
Price, and Goad, were lucky to be spurred on and provided the means by
their institutions; others, like Rashevsky and Pauling, fought within until
they found external solutions; still others, like Butler, d’Herelle, and Morgan,
didn’t even try.
But if institutional support has a variable inﬂuence, collaborations, almost
across the board, seem crucial. Pauling (with Alfred Mirsky, Karl Landsteiner,
and then Emile Zuckerkandl), Price (with John Maynard Smith and Bill
Hamilton), and Weiner (with Arturo Rosenblueth) all prove how important
work with bona ﬁde insiders possessing complementary (rather than identical) skills can be. None of these outsiders would have been able to get very far
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without their collaborators. Their work on protein stabilization by hydrogen
bonds, antibody speciﬁcity, evolutionary molecular clocks, the evolutionary stable strategy, multilevel selection, and negative feedback, respectively,
would have been the worse for it. Pauling explained the cooperative dynamic
nicely: “Landsteiner would ask, ‘What do these experimental observations
force us to believe about the world?’ and I would ask, ‘What is the most
simple, general, and intellectually satisfying picture of the world that encompasses these observations and is not incompatible with them?’ ” The collaborators’ methodological departures and diﬀerences in perspective, as well as
their help in the more mundane technicalities—such as learning correct notations and suitable experimental designs—proved crucial to these outsiders
for solving important problems. In some cases, as in Price’s, aﬃxing one’s
name beside that of a well-known insider also made a great diﬀerence.
Outsiders turn to fellow outsiders for collaborations as much as they do
to insiders. Pauling, for instance, worked with the biochemist Robert Corey
on determining structures of amino acids and on models of protein chains;
Corey was as much an outsider in his way to biochemistry as Pauling was to
molecular biology. Weiner joined hands with an electrical engineer collaborator, Julian Bigelow, to work together with the insider Rosenblueth. Goad
worked with the physical chemist John Camm; together they examined
transport processes in biological systems on IBM 704 and 7094 machines.
Francois Jacob sent his own bacteria and phage men, Hubert Condamine
and Charles Babinet, to study mammalian embryology and to return to his
lab; Jacob himself declined to learn from the insiders directly. Schrödinger
may have wanted to shake up biologists, but it was the physicists—Seymour
Benzer, Crick, George Gamow, Salvador Luria—who heeded his call more
than anyone else. But Endy is perhaps the ultimate example of an outsider
who knew he would need to turn to like-minded outsiders to get anywhere at
all: he extended his hand to Tom Knight and his fellow electrical engineers
at MIT rather than engage true insiders in biology. When he found himself at
a disciplinary crossroads—should he study more molecular biology from
the inside or think as an outsider engineer?—Endy determined to “screw
it,” since the complications and details of biology seemed “of little interest.”
Courting the inside is sometimes a requisite for outsiders, even if looking at Endy’s path doesn’t immediately divulge this. The biological world
into which both Weiner and von Neumann were attempting to enter, for
example, was anything but hospitable. Ehud Lamm quotes E. B. Wilson, at
the 1934 Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology, oﬀering a
number of axioms to the initiated, the ﬁrst of which was “science need not
be mathematical,” and the second, “simply because a subject is mathemati14 | oren harman & michael r. dietrich
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cal it need not therefore be scientiﬁc.” The inside, clearly, was less than inviting. Incidentally, Weiner and von Neumann ended up choosing diﬀerent
approaches to engaging biologists—the former seeking out collaboration,
the latter going it alone.
The writers Samuel Butler and Elaine Morgan, too, understood full well
that they needed to court their readership—whether by gripping drama,
scathing wit, gentle humor, or all of these—and directed their talents inward
as much as out. Still, popularization was an issue: the way to succeed, both
authors knew, entailed capturing the hearts and minds of the public. As
Michael Ruse explains, when it came to evolution, before 1859 the subject
was considered a pseudoscience, after 1930 it was professionalized, and in between its status was ambiguous (though it may be objected that early ﬁgures
as central as George Cuvier and Karl Ernst von Baer took evolution seriously
enough to go to great lengths to dispute it, and that evolution was taught
in many German universities by 1860, and even before).12 Focusing on the
English-speaking world, Ruse argues that evolution was a popular science
during this period, and the popular book or novel as legitimate and inﬂuential a venue as the scientiﬁc paper. Insiders like T. H. Huxley and George
Romanes grasped this, which is why they themselves attempted to speak to
the public alongside their more professional writings, understanding full
well, if reluctantly, that this meant the door had been pushed wide open. Butler capitalized, building a successful career as a popular writer on evolution.
After him, Morgan did too, though in her day she was required to mount a
tighter argument, based on a careful reading of the scientiﬁc evidence. And
while Noam Chomsky may have awaited his Steven Pinker, he has nevertheless used the television to great eﬀect in making himself known as a public
intellectual, as much for his linguistic theories as for his politics.
On Innovation
Outsiders bring with them new language as well as designs. In order to
express their innovative ideas, then, they must engage in a process of translation.13 Schrödinger, for example, transported terminology such as “isomers” from organic chemistry to describe diﬀerent stable states of genes,
and “tunneling” from physics to speak of the process of translation between
such states to help explain, among other things, mutations. “Negative entropy” was another concept he used to translate a concept from thermodynamics into one in molecular biology, a translation that may well have
given birth to more confusion than clarity.
Price, too, as Harman shows, went about the business of translating concepts, in his case from Claude Shannon’s channel capacity informatics to
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selection dynamics more broadly. It was the precision and beauty of the
formalization of the theory of communication that Price sought to translate
into biology. Von Neumann and Weiner were very much engaged in a kind of
translation enterprise as well, using “self-reproducing automata” and “negative feedback” as central concepts otherwise unheard of within biology.
And Endy fashioned repressible promoters as transistors, the biological
and genetic equivalents to toggle switches and oscillators.
Translating, or rather getting insiders to understand translations, isn’t
always easy, as the correspondence between Joshua Lederberg and Jon von
Neumann attests. Lederberg wanted to know how intracellular components
correspond to the elements of the cellular automata model, but von Neumann’s conceptual model had no relation to biological realities. Lionel Penrose, too, found it diﬃcult to ﬁnd answers to speciﬁc biological questions
in von Neumann’s model, in par ticular those having to do with the physical
and chemical aspects of self-reproduction. For both biologists, the engagement with the mathematician proved frustrating.
Indeed, biology is a messy science, full of details and exceptions. It is for this
reason that many of the outsiders coming in—in particular, theoreticians and
those with mathematical and physical skills—sought to simplify matters in
order, as it were, to see the forest independently of the trees. Rashevsky, to
be sure, wanted to transform biology into a deductive science rather than an
empirically based one, where theory based on oversimpliﬁed—often grossly
oversimpliﬁed—scenarios (of cell division, growth, nerve conduction, brain
function, etc.) could be used to predict trends rather than exact values, and
help direct avenues of research. In looking at island biogeography, species abundance distribution, and optimal foraging strategies, MacArthur
preferred “patterns” to trends. Indeed, science itself was to him essentially
a matter of detecting patterns, an approach that allowed him to transform
ecology from a descriptive science to a structured and predictive one. But
integrating genetics, ecology, biogeography, and ethology was no small order, and by necessity it called for simplifying. Indeed, the members of the
Marlboro Circle to which he belonged—Egbert Leigh, E. O. Wilson, Richard
Levins, and Richard Lewontin—all agreed that only two of any three goals—
generality, realism, and precision—could ever be maximized, and MacArthur
preferred the ﬁrst two. They called it the “simple theory” approach. “Our
truth is the intersection of independent lies,” was how Levins put it, with
commendable honesty.
Price, too, sought to simplify by generalizing. His tautological covariance
equation had exactly zero biological assumptions in it, which is precisely why
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it was diﬃcult for many biologists to appreciate its import (many still don’t).
Endy’s synthetic biology, almost by deﬁnition, was a science of standardization, hence simpliﬁcation. And von Neumann, looking at self-reproduction,
was interested in the internal functional orga nization of the system, an
exercise accomplished by axiomatizing the behavior of the system’s components. This again was an idealization, and hence a simpliﬁcation, rather
than an attempt to describe real biological phenomena.
Simpliﬁcations oﬀered by outsiders invariably ruﬄe the feathers of insiders to the point of fury. Theodosius Dobzhansky was being gentle when
he intoned, as Lamm quotes him: “Experience has shown that, at least in biology, generalization and integration can best be made by scientists who are
also fact-gatherers, rather than by specialists in biological speculation.” The
future Nobel laureate neurophysiologist John Eccles was harsher, letting the
community know that he thought his own ﬁeld would be strictly impeded,
rather than advanced, by superﬁcial analogies to automata. And Endy’s
detractors so resisted the idealization behind his “Standard Parts List for
Biological Circuitry” that Endy invited disgruntled biologists to send complaints to the “Oﬃce of Biological Disenchantment, MIT 68-580” (in other
words, his oﬃce in the electrical engineering department). Still, despite its
detractors, simpliﬁcation has been a real motor for innovation.
At the base of the ability to simplify, generalize, and translate stands the
par ticular training and intellectual territory from whence the outsider arrives. Take for example Pauling’s background in crystallography, which solidiﬁed his unshakeable belief in the idea that properties of all substances
depend on their structure. It was this “methodological structural reductionism,” as Gregory Morgan calls it, that pushed him to seek the explanation of
cellular behavior at a “deeper” level, leading to the solution of the alpha helix, among other problems. Take Weiner’s work on target-tracking machines
for the American Air Force during World War II: it was here that he ﬁrst
encountered the oscillatory movement for which he found an analogue in
the intention tremors of human cerebral patients, and which, via the wedding of feedback to intentionality, became the conceptual centerpiece of
the science of cybernetics. Or take Price’s work at Bell Labs with Shockley
and Bardeen, which familiarized him with Claude Shannon’s theory of communication, a theory he then sought to apply to the process of biological
selection. Or Goad’s earlier work in physics on the hydrogen bomb, which,
Hallam Stevens claims, is responsible for the introduction of computers
into mainstream biology. Goad recognized that the kind of numerical and
statistical methods he had used to solve data-intensive problems in ﬁssion
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and fusion could be applied, using digital electronic computers, to genetics.
GenBank, the database he created, was premised on the notion that biological problems could be framed as pattern-matching and data-management
problems. Ultimately, the system of sharing, communication, organizing, and
distributing DNA sequence data that it produced allowed for the birth of
the Human Genome Project. In all these cases, there is a direct connection,
even a direct analogy, between prior work in one ﬁeld and the later work in
biology.
Endy, too, in calling for an “open source biology” based on “tools of mass
construction,” deployed an analogy between Boolean electrical gates that
can perform simple operation such as AND, OR, NOT, NAND, NOR and
genetic components that could be construed as “BioBricks.” In so doing, he
swept away with one blow the model organism approach, since, to his mind
at least, standardized biological parts rendered such lab-based practices unnecessary. As Luis Campos argues, this was the ultimate outsider biology—
outside of the conﬁnes of even the organism itself or the species—but it was
based on a functional analogy and a conﬁdent assurance of its validity. Pasteur, too, saw an analogy between fermentation and infectious diseases, as
Jonathan Simon elucidates. This vision drew a direct line for him between
his chemical work, on the one hand, and his medical-biological work on the
other. The Frenchman’s eye for the utility of organisms oriented microbiology ﬁrst to industrial production and then to the treatment of disease,
two directions that would be enhanced by d’Herelle’s international work in
the twentieth century.
Analogy is not the only route for the introduction of a divergent disciplinary understanding into biology. Sometimes a general approach, or a par ticular skill, will suﬃce. Take, for instance, Metchnikoﬀ. It was the Russian’s
embryological preoccupations and Darwinian framework that informed his
challenge, both methodological and theoretical, to the prevailing immunological theories of his time. These proved of little interest to microbiologists
and immunochemists, who had no background in development to speak of
and who were focused on deﬁning the mediators of immune response rather
than looking at the etiology of the entire system. But Metchnikoﬀ had the
vision to perceive the connection between one set of problems—evolutionary
and developmental—and the mystery of identity as presented by immunity.
As Fred Tauber argues, it may very well be the case that only an outsider, aloof
from the immediate concerns of the dominant scientiﬁc community, could
have posed the question of identity in the face of dynamic change so starkly.
Elaine Morgan, too, crossed a divide by bringing with her something of
value. In her case, it was her pen. An English major at Oxford and a mother
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of three, Morgan had spent a life writing screenplays and dramas for the BBC
from a quiet base in Wales. But with an irascible wit and a fortunate turn of
phrase, she was able to address that most basic of a readership’s faculties
directly: its common sense. “Learn to trust the evidence of your own senses
over that of the written word,” she wrote with just a pinch of disingenuousness, knowing full well that the written word was her best weapon. Indeed,
Morgan could aﬀord to give a full and forceful treatment to a theory that had
been proposed thirty years earlier by an insider, Alister Hardy, who, not yet
having “Sir” aﬃxed to his forename, had been wary to publish anything that
might damage his nascent scientiﬁc career. When it came to advocating the
“aquatic ape” theory, Morgan, by her own admission, had “nothing to lose,
no high academic position to think of.” What she did have, however, was the
skills of a dramaturge.
Coming from the outside in and of itself may allow for exercising greater
imagination alongside, or even in some cases as an alternative to directly
transporting par ticular tools, skills, or methods from home disciplines.
Schrödinger’s precise combinatorial model, Sahotra Sarkar argues, and his
truly revolutionary and insightful notion of a genetic code, had less to do
with his background as a physicist and more with an unrestrained inventiveness. George Price, too, in translating game theory from economics and
international aﬀairs to animal behavior, wasn’t necessarily applying hardwon skills to a new setting, but rather exercising the kind of imaginative associative thinking which is so often stiﬂed by internalist training and worldview. To be sure, outsiders have often been lambasted for being unqualiﬁed:
such was Elaine Morgan’s fate, as well as that of Rashevsky’s, at least up to a
certain point. But Samuel Butler, who had the distinction of being attacked
by both T. H. Huxley and his grandson Julian, rather saw being an amateur
as an advantage. (Huxley the grandson regarded Butler, alongside George
Bernard Shaw, as “literary men,” whose views are “based not on scientiﬁc
fact and method, but on wish-fulﬁllment”). As Michael Ruse shows, Butler
remained an outsider with respect to clubs and scientiﬁc societies and the
like, but thought that being an amateur actually gave him a fresher perspective over the professionals (including and especially Darwin!).
A fresh perspective, then, may be the lot, or luck, of a diﬀerent kind of
professional even when he thinks of himself, or is termed, an “amateur.” Prior
training in a diﬀerent discipline or intellectual community may aﬀord special
access to associative or imaginative thinking and the ability to analogize.
Speciﬁc methods and tools from home disciplines can serve as keys with
which to enter from the outside and unlock particular questions. And the fact
that the outsider may have little to lose may pose as an advantage, too.
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But so can something even more prosaic. When François Jacob decided
that he was going to try to apply the principles he had learned from studying
bacteria and the viruses that attack them to the mouse and the diseases that
attack it (and other mammals), he was following a considered personal philosophy of science that regarded theories and models as nothing more than
the recombination of elements present in previous theories and models.
This to him was not only how “Nature the tinkerer” worked, but how science
itself advances. And outsiders, he believed, are often in the best position to
introduce new combinations. But, as Michel Morange aptly recognizes, this
may very well be due simply to the fact that outsiders are much less conscious of obstacles, while being prone to “transgressions” because they are
not at all familiar with the “rules of the game.” In Jacob’s case, there were
massive obstacles to climb in moving from the simplest of model organisms to the most complex. Had these obstacles been known to him more
precisely, they might have dissuaded him from trying. In the end, due to his
work and others’, the mouse became the choice model organism for studying mechanisms of disease in humans. In Schrödinger’s case there were
massive biochemical and molecular obstacles to scale as well, and much
relevant biological knowledge remained unmastered. But as Francis Crick
made clear, the main point of What Is Life?—that biology needs the stability
of chemical bonds—“was one that only a physicist would feel it necessary to
make.” And, of course, it made a diﬀerence. Lack of knowledge, or naiveté,
may be as important to innovation as highly speciﬁc forms of know-how and
sophistication.
The Platypus
Outsiders don’t always leave a mark, even when they try hard to do so. In
this book David Hull is a stark example, a man as well placed as any on
both sides of a disciplinary divide (in his case philosophy and systematics). Hull himself believed that a philosopher could “uncover, explicate and
possibly solve problems in biological theory and methodology,” but, as
T. J. Horder shows, he ended up contributing more to “studying the science
of science scientiﬁcally”—a title of one of his papers—than to any debate
within systematics. Indeed, Hull was very much aware that the majority of
scientists invariably ﬁnd the work of philosophers, at least when it comes to
their own ﬁeld, superﬂuous. This is not to say that there is an unbreachable
chasm between philosophy and the “hard core” of scientiﬁc practice, but
that some disciplinary divides are harder to negotiate than others. Persuading biologists of the deep relevance of philosophy to their work continues to be a challenge.
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What is clear, however, is the extent to which modern biology has been
constituted as a pastiche, a conglomeration of diﬀerent methods and tools
and points of view and approaches. The term “genetics” was coined by William Bateson in a private letter in 1905, but as a glance at Gregor Mendel’s story
makes obvious, the modern theory of heredity had come into being as a
blend between experimental physics, commercial plant breeding, botany,
animal husbandry, local natural history, and even law. Microbiology, too, was
later forged in a disciplinary furnace, to which chemistry, agriculture, medicine, and economics all contributed. And molecular biology was constituted
like a tassel of disparate strands, as researchers from diﬀerent ﬁelds led by
par ticular problems found themselves obliged to master a host of tools and
methods hitherto unlisted on the “how to” menu of the biologist.
Indeed, when Noam Chomsky challenged behaviorism, wielding the
sword of generative linguistics, he was functioning as an outsider storming
the gates, whereas when he championed animal behavior–inﬂuenced nativist biolinguistic theories, as W. Tecumseh Fitch shows, he was more like the
insider importing “outsider” ideas. The overall result of these interventions
was the refashioning of something called cognitive sciences that expanded
the purview of biology. Whether or not “synthetic biology” will become a
mainstay of the life sciences remains to be seen, but if Endy’s gradual refashioning of the engineering vision from a revolutionary agenda into “nothing
new here” is an indication of anything, it is that “biology” as a discipline is an
ever-changing quantity.
The point, as Heraclitus might have appreciated, is that what is construed
as “in” and “out” is and always has been in constant ﬂux. The biological
traveler can never step twice into the same river; he will ﬁnd that not only
have the waters changed—their color, temperature, and speed—but the
banks, too, have changed, laying out a new topography. Indeed, the very
organisms swimming about have morphed and been hunted and restocked
from neighboring rivers. In biology—especially in biology—“outsiders” have
been transformative.
In a very real sense, as Richard Lewontin stresses in the epilogue to this
volume, the extreme dynamism of the life sciences problematizes the concept of biology “outside the box.” Indeed, it problematizes the very notion
of a “box.” An example comes from a 1997 paper from the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences on resistance to phosphate insecticide in a
sheep blowﬂy. The paper—the fruit of a collaboration between botanists, zoologists, and chemists—makes the point starkly: here, the biological eﬀect of
resistance is unrobed step by step all the way down to a single atom eﬀect,
moving the analysis from biology to chemistry to physics. Does speaking
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of an epistemic biological “box” help to understand how science is done in
this case, Lewontin asks? Indeed, is this really an epistemic box at all? The
answer, it seems, is to a great degree a reﬂection of the history of modern
biology: the gradual erasure, made possible both by methodological and
theoretical advances, of the boundary between life and non-life, as well as
the growing ability to look at systems as constituted by components, amenable to mathematical and physical analysis. This is not merely, or simply,
a story of reduction, but rather more accurately of accumulating more tools
deemed relevant to the solution of mysteries provided by the natural world.
As the tools multiply, so the epistemic “box” is enlarged to accommodate
them. Yes, asking how a blowﬂy has become resistant to phosphate insecticide would be considered by most to fall under the purview of biology, but
the way we attempt to answer such a question today as opposed to forty or
sixty or one hundred years ago renders “biology” an ever-changing constant.
■

Looking at the “duck-bill mole” and other oddities of Australian wildlife,
Governor John Hunter oﬀered in 1793 that “a promiscuous intercourse between the diﬀerent sexes of all these diﬀerent animals might account for
their unlikely forms.”14 Indeed, so strange was the beast that the great German comparative anatomist Johann Blumenbach christened it in 1800 Ornithorhynchus paradoxus. It would take time and careful scrutiny before the
evolutionary lineage of the platypus was better understood, but even today,
with all that we know, it remains a wondrous vision.
And so does biology, that most hodgepodge of all sciences. Still, as we hope
readers will agree, the chimeric character of biology has often served it well.
The cases in Outsider Scientists reveal how personal features such as persistence, institutional features such as the presence of willing patrons, mentors,
and collaborators, and intellectual features such as the ability to create useful
analogies and translations between ﬁelds fostered and promoted innovation
in biology by newcomers as they constantly shaped and reshaped its form.
The outsiders proﬁled in these pages, never content to merely “think diﬀerently,” engaged themselves in the hard work of articulating connections between ideas, practices, people, and institutions that allowed their work to get
a hearing among biologists and to gain a measure of inﬂuence. The success of
these outsiders speaks not merely to their persuasiveness, but to their ability
to understand key features of disparate ﬁelds and then build the bridges that
connect and ultimately transform them.
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